Virtue Ethics: Not Practically Useful, Either

A sharp case against virtue ethics (following up his After Virtue review and its defenders). Scott grants the steelman -- that virtue ethics doesn't claim to solve the first problem of ethics (knowing what's right) but is the uniquely-excellent solution to the second (doing what you know is right) -- and still disagrees, on two fronts. (1) Descriptively, it isn't how he experiences morality: his is a 'missile locking onto a target' / subagent introspection (serene certainty when calm; game-theoretic rationalization when angry; arduousness-aversion when tired), which is contrary to virtue ethics in every way (not role-based, not divisible into named virtues like 'continence,' not narrative or community-bound) -- and claiming virtue ethics is how 'people naturally think' is a typical-mind fallacy. (2) As a technology for making people more moral, it's 'like medieval medicine' -- untested -- and he lists ~30 things more likely to work (belief in the Devil, moral realism; willpower training, journaling, friends, fiction; above all lovingkindness meditation, which grounds morality in caring about others). The capstone is a fine grammar analogy: a 'virtue grammar' that shouts 'just use your natural grammar sense!' instead of formally studying how grammar works would be a waste -- and virtue ethics is that for ethics. Sharp and characteristic, if somewhat in-the-weeds as a response post.

Quality 69 · Strong. Low-Strong (69): a sharp, well-argued, characteristically-Scott case against virtue ethics (both as description and as moral-improvement technology), elevated by the excellent grammar analogy and the candid introspective report. Held just below the upper-Strong tier because it's a somewhat in-the-weeds response post and leans partly on idiosyncratic introspection.

Claude’s paradigm shift 46 · Moderate. Moderate (46): the grammar analogy and the 'virtue ethics is practically useless even at its supposed job' critique are a fresh, pointed contribution, though within an existing metaethical debate.

Real-world impact 2 · Minor. An in-the-weeds philosophical response post against virtue ethics; a contribution to the ethics discourse with no reach into practice, institutions, or ordinary lives → RWI 2.