A defense of logical positivism (yes, really)

Defends logical positivism (verificationism) -- everyone in philosophy 'knows' it's wrong, but Scott likes it as 'vaguely pointing at a cluster of correct things,' like the ancient atomists. Traces a through-line from Hume's fork (relations of ideas vs matters of fact) to the logical positivists (meaningful = empirically verifiable or logically tautological; else nonsense) to LessWrong's 'Highly Advanced Epistemology' sequence. Argues the rough system is productive -- it red-flags meaningless statements -- and shows how math, morality, and even counterfactuals can be cashed out as empirical-or-logical. Concedes Popper's self-refutation objection but defends it pragmatically as 'that which can be debated.'

Quality 66 · Strong. Strong (66). A clear, modest defense of an unfashionable position with a useful framing (the atoms analogy) and decent worked examples (math/morality/counterfactuals reduced to empirical-or-logical). Held mid-Strong: exploratory and self-described 'sketchy,' more a sympathetic gesture than a rigorous defense. Scored on merit (2013).

Claude’s paradigm shift 42 · Moderate. Moderate (42). Reviving an old position (positivism) rather than a new idea; the fresh bit is situating it on a Hume -> positivism -> LW-epistemics continuum.

Real-world impact 2 · Minor. 2 -- minor/within-blog. A philosophy-of-meaning argument; within-discourse, no material footprint.