Are wireheads happy?

Takes the literal question 'are wireheads happy?' to introduce the neuroscience of 'wanting' vs. 'liking' (Berridge's Michigan rat work: dopamine-mediated incentive 'wanting' and opioid-mediated 'liking' are dissociable circuits, each knock-out-able without the other). Everyday evidence: Pringles (wanting without much liking), procrastinating things you genuinely enjoy (liking without wanting). The payoff is philosophical: revealed-preference utility tracks WANTING, not LIKING, so utilitarianism and economics quietly conflate two different things — and the standard 'revealed preferences' put-down (the New Yorker who says they'd rather live elsewhere but doesn't) may be wrong, because working overtime for an iPhone you want over family you like can be a hijacking of true preferences rather than a revelation of them. Ends by asking which altruists/governments/FAIs should maximize.

Quality 77 · Excellent. Strong (top). A clear, genuinely illuminating application of real neuroscience to philosophy and economics, with a sharp original payoff (the wanting/liking dissociation undercuts revealed-preference reasoning and complicates what utilitarians should maximize). Held at 77 because the underlying neuroscience is Berridge's, conveyed; Scott's contribution is the application. 77.

Claude’s paradigm shift 52 · Moderate. Moderate. The wanting/liking science is established; the novel-in-2010 move is applying it to utility, revealed preferences, and value-maximization. 52.

Real-world impact 3 · Moderate. A clear, illuminating application of real wanting/liking neuroscience (Berridge) to philosophy and economics, with a sharp original payoff (the dissociation undercuts revealed-preference reasoning). Conceptual influence within rationalist discourse, no material change — modest RWI.