Would Your Real Preferences Please Stand Up?

Takes on the 'Cynic's Theory of Akrasia' (Caplan/Hanson: there's no real self-control problem — your revealed preferences ARE your real ones, and 'I want to change' is just social-desirability signaling; the drunk really prefers Jack Daniels to his family) versus the 'Naive Theory' (you genuinely want to stop, but the unconscious hijacks your actions). Scott's move: they're structurally EQUIVALENT — in both, the conscious mind sets the signal and the unconscious determines the action (the self-deceiver who fools others by fooling himself); they differ only in which one you sympathize with and label 'real.' The Cynic privileges the unconscious/revealed preference (natural for economists); Scott throws his support behind the Naive Theory, because the conscious mind is the one that is potentially rational, moral, and qualia-laden — 'who cares what [the unconscious] thinks?' Notes the political stakes (which preferences count).

Quality 74 · Strong. Strong. A sharp dissolution — showing the cynical and naive akrasia stories are the same structure with opposite sympathies — plus a principled reason to privilege the conscious mind. Held at 74 by brevity. 74.

Claude’s paradigm shift 46 · Moderate. Moderate. Builds on the revealed-preference/self-deception literature (Caplan, Hanson); the equivalence argument and the conscious-mind defense are the fresh contribution. 46.

Real-world impact 2 · Minor. A sharp dissolution showing the cynical (revealed-preference) and naive akrasia theories are the same structure with opposite sympathies, plus a principled reason to privilege the conscious mind. Conceptual influence within rationalist discourse, brief, no material change — low RWI.