Contra Kirkegaard On Evolutionary Definitions Of Mental Illness

Replies to Emil Kirkegaard's proposed definition: a mental disorder = a mental trait that lowers reproductive fitness. Scott's move (his signature 'categories were made for man'): this is a DIFFERENT useful concept from his own (conditions bad for the person/society) - call them disorder-(Emil) vs disorder-(Scott) - and gives seven examples where Emil's definition gives counterintuitive results (ADHD raises fertility -> not-having-ADHD becomes the disorder; alcoholism; ephebophilia; Plato/celibacy; chronic pain/nightmares don't impede fitness; 'severity' would rank homosexuality above schizophrenia; is contrarianism itself a disorder?). Concludes both concepts are useful but distinct, and Emil should coin a new term ('genetic maladaptation') because the hundreds of millions who need 'mental disorder' for practical purposes should keep custody of the word.

Quality 72 · Strong. Strong - clear, persuasive, with well-chosen reductios (the ADHD-fertility reversal, homosexuality-more-severe-than-schizophrenia). A clean execution of his standard dual-concept/definitional move, held at Strong (not higher) because it's an application of an existing framework to a specific interlocutor, somewhat niche/topical. Sits with the run's other solid Contra essays (cf. Contra-Skolnick 72).

Claude’s paradigm shift 48 · Moderate. Moderate - the dual-concept 'categories were made for man' move is Scott's own 2014 framework; the evolutionary-vs-practical mental-disorder application is a fresh use of it, not a new idea.

Real-world impact 2 · Minor. Within-discourse philosophy-of-psychiatry essay; no material reach.